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We investigate the empirical determinants of China’s outward direct investment (ODI). It is 
found that China’s investments in developed and developing countries are driven by different 
sets of factors. Subject to the differences between developed and developing countries, there 
is evidence that a) both market seeking and resources seeking motives drive China’s ODI, b) 
the Chinese exports to developing countries induce China’s ODI, c) China’s international 
reserves promote its ODI, and d) the Chinese capital tends to agglomerate among developed 
economies but diversify among developing economies. Similar results are obtained using 
alternative ODI data. We do not find substantial evidence that China invests in African and 
oil-producing countries mainly for their natural resources. 
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1. Introduction 
Whether it is entirely true or apocryphal, the emergence of China in the global economic 
stage has engendered a strong feeling of déjà vu. During pre-modern times, China was estimated 
to have a per capita GDP higher than that of Europe before 1280, and accounted for 23.2% to 
32.4% of world output from 1700 to 1820 (Maddison, 1998). Indeed, China was one of the major 
trading centers in the world. During the 16
th and 17
th centuries, China ran a substantial trade 
balance surplus and was referred to as the “sink” for silver, the vehicle currency of international 
trade in the de facto silver standard era (Sakakibara and Yamakawa, 2003a, b). There is little 
doubt that the re-emergence of China is changing the landscape of the global economy; the 
question is, in what direction? 
There is a plethora of analyses of China’s economic prowess in terms of, say, its 
ballooning trade surplus and international reserves, and its ability to draw in foreign direct 
investment (FDI).
1 The role of China as an outward investor has been seldom discussed and only 
catches attention following some publicized large-scale (attempted) buyouts of the US 
companies including the IBM’s personal computer division and the oil company Unocal. 
Compared with inflows, China’s outward direct investment (ODI) is quite small. 
According to the United Nations statistics, the China’s FDI inflow and ODI ratio was 6.4 to 1 in 
2005. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, China’s direct investment abroad 
has surged apace. During the 1994 – 1999 period, China’s outward investment stood at the level 
of US$ 2.2 billion (annual average) and accounted for 3.4% of outflows from developing 
countries. In 2005, China’s outward investment jumped fivefold to 11.3 billion and accounted for 
9.6% of outflows from developing countries. With its burgeoning trade surplus and international 
reserves, China is expected to enhance its role as a significant provider in the international 
capital market. Indeed, China ranks fourth in the list of expected leading sources of FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2005). 
One interesting feature of China’s outward investment is its concentration in developing 
countries. The 2007 United Nations report, for example, points out that China is one of the major 
capital providers for developing countries in Africa (UNCTAD, 2007). China’s outward 
investment, thus, has substantial implications for the economic development of the world 
                                                 
1   Other closely scrutinized issues including the Chinese currency valuation and trade imbalances; see for 
sample, Cheung et al. (2007) and Cheung et al. (2009).    2
economy in general and for developing countries in particular. Further, together with capital 
inflows, capital outflows offer a balanced way to integrate China into the global economy. 
Against this backdrop, we examine the Chinese investment in overseas markets. To be 
sure, we are hardly walking in fresh snow and there are a few studies on China’s ODI. The extant 
studies are mostly descriptive in nature and policy-oriented.
2 The theme of the current exercise is 
to empirically analyze the evolution of China’s ODI and its determinants.  
To anticipate the results, China’s outward investment displayed a steady increase in the 
1990s and a surge in the new millennium. There is also a discernable change in the composition 
of the host countries and the industry mix of China’s overseas investment. The estimation results 
lend support to the conjecture that China has different motivations in deploying its capital to 
developed and developing countries.  
In addition to the usual economic explanatory variables, we examine the motive of 
servicing exports, the role of international reserves, and the agglomeration effect. These factors 
are found to have varying degrees of explanatory power across developed and developing 
countries. In examining the data from African and oil-producing countries, we find only limited 
evidence that exports of natural resources from these countries attract some additional amount of 
China’s ODI. 
In the next section, we briefly describe China’s outward investment policy and present 
some preliminary descriptions of China’s ODI data. Section 3 contains the main empirical results. 
Some additional analyses are provided in Section 4. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Preliminary Discussions 
2.1 A  Brief  History 
Arguably, the open door policy initiated in 1978 was – and remains – a key defining 
event in the contemporary Chinese economic history.
3 The change in FDI policy accompanying 
economic reform programs has greatly altered the economic scene. Indeed, there are two prongs 
                                                 
2   Sung (1996) and Wall (1997) are two early studies on China’s ODI. Some recent studies 
include UNCTAD (2003), Wong and Chan (2003) and Wu and Chen (2001). Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada (2005, 2006) offered some insights on China’s ODI behavior from the 
perspectives of the Chinese enterprises. 
3   Officially, the policy change was adopted in the 1978 National Party Congress. See 
Rosen (1999) and OECD (2005) for accounts of the open door policy and its implications.    3
of China’s foreign direction investment policy – one is to attract FDI inflow and the other is to 
place capital in overseas markets. Until recently, the success of attracting inflows has 
overshadowed the outward investment strategy. 
Indeed, the ODI activity in the 1980s is quite minimal. Direct investment abroad in this 
period is perceived to be driven by political rather than economic considerations. Before 1985, 
only state-owned and local-government-owned enterprises were allowed to invest overseas. 
After 1985, private enterprises were permitted to apply for ODI projects. By, say, 1990, the stock 
of ODI stood at the level of US$1.2 billion. While the activity is negligible, the period can be 
viewed as a period for authorities to design and develop procedures and policies for ODI. 
Between 1991 and 1997, there was a flux of ODI to, especially, Hong Kong. The track 
record of these investment projects was not good. Due to the lack of investment know-how, 
ignorance about the rule of law in overseas markets, and corruption, there are instances of 
substantial losses from ODI projects. Thus, the period witnessed an upsurge of ODI activity 
followed by a tightening of approval procedures. At the end of 1997, the stock of ODI was at the 
level of US$2.4 billion. This period is the time China got a reality check on making commercial 
overseas investment.  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis changed the global economic landscape. In adjusting its 
ODI strategy, China in 1999 issued a directive to encourage direct investment abroad that 
promotes China’s exports via “processing trade” investment. The directive signifies an important 
shift of China’s policy – from promoting overseas investment to directing ODI. 
In 2002, the Chinese authorities pushed the “going global” or “stepping out” strategy to 
sustain the economic reform process and to promote global industry champions in the wake of 
the WTO accession.
4 On July 16, 2004, the authorities made another change in their ODI policy 
stance – they pronounced their roles of, in addition to approving applications, supervising and 
providing services. With these changes in the “going global” strategy, the Chinese enterprises are 
quite aggressive in the international capital market. Indeed, the Chinese outward investment is 
brought under the spotlight following some recent attempts to secure natural resources in 
developing countries and large-scale acquisition activities in the US. 
                                                 
4   For example, the 2002 issue of the Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade discusses the effort to implement vigorously the “going global” policy. Sometimes, the 
“going global” policy is translated as the “go global” policy.   4
  In sum, since China opened up in 1978, the ODI policy has evolved together with other 
economic reform policies. Specifically, the ODI strategy has been transformed from a purely 
political devise to a more market-oriented operation. In terms of the group of players, it has 
expanded from mainly state-owned enterprises to a mix of state-owned and commercial entities. 
Nevertheless, there is still a heavy state involvement in the ODI activity; at least, it is what is 
perceived by the rest of the world. While the absolute magnitude of China’s ODI is quite small 
compared with other sources of FDI, China is expected to be among the top 5 leading FDI 
exporters in both the 2004 and 2005 UN surveys (UNCTAD; 2004, 2005).  
 
2.2 China’s  ODI 
 





































































































































                 China's ODI as a percentage of the world total FDI          
                    China’s ODI as a percentage of the total FDI from developing countries (excluding offshore 
financial centers including British Virgin Islands, Burmuda, Cayman Islands, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore) 
                    China’s ODI stock (Right Axis) 
Note: Data are from UNCTAD (2006). 
 
Figure 1 plots China’s ODI. The value of ODI was relatively stable in the 1980s, 
increased steadily in the 1990s, and displayed a sharp upward momentum in the new millennium.   5
As a share of the world total FDI, China’s ODI is quite small despite its twofold increase from 
0.27% in 1991 to 0.54% in 2005. On the other hand, the Chinese capital accounts for a steadily 
increasing proportion of the total FDI from developing countries, excluding offshore financial 
centers, during the sample period. In a word, the size of China’s ODI is quite small but its 
trajectory is quite promising. 
 




            The proportion of China’s ODI stock in  
developing countries 
           The proportion of China’s ODI stock in 
developed countries 
 
Note: Data are from the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues 
 
Figure 2 plots the shares of China’s ODI stock in developed and developing countries. 
While flows to both developed and developing countries are increasing over time, the shares of 
the stock of ODI to developing countries show a clear trend. In 1999, the proportion of China’s 
ODI in developing countries overtook that in developed countries. Since then, a larger and larger 
proportion is directed towards developing countries. The observation is in accordance with the 
usual belief that China is intensifying its economic involvements in developing countries. 
  China’s ODI covers a wide geographic distribution. As of 2005, China invested in 163 
countries and engaged in an extensive range of economic activities, including information 
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are fairly concentrated in a few economies such as Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, Macau, Russia, 
and the US. Indeed, according to the official approval data from various issues of the Almanac of 
China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, the top 50 recipient countries on average 
received over 90% of China’s ODI during the 1991-2005 period.  
 
Figure 3: The geographic distribution of China's stock of Overseas Direct Investment 
 
 
                   1991                   1998             2005 
 
Note: Data are from the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, various issues 
 
 
Snapshots of the geographic distributions in 1991, 1998, and 2005 are given in Figure 3. 
There is a discernable change in the geographic distribution of China’s ODI over time. For 
instance, Asia is hosting an increasing share of China’s ODI – its share has increased from 16% 
(1991) to 47% (2005). Latin America and Europe are the other two regions that experienced an 
increase of China’s capital inflow with the former showing a more noticeable increase than the 
latter. These gains are registered at the expense of the flows to North America and Oceania.  
During these 15 years, Canada and the US in North America and Australia in Oceania account 
for a decreasing share of China’s ODI stock. Specifically, these countries together hosted over 








Asia  Latin America  North America Africa Europe Oceania   7
experiences an increase followed by a decrease in its share of China’s ODI. In general, these 
numbers attest to the growing importance of Asia and Latin America and the declining role of 
North America and Oceania in hosting the Chinese capital.    
In passing, we note that the evolution of the geographic distribution is qualitatively the 
same if Hong Kong and Macau, which are China’s two special administration regions that have 
attracted a “disproportionately” large share of China’s capital, were excluded from Figure 3.
5   
 
Figure 4: The Sectoral Distribution of China's Stock of Overseas Direct Investment 
 
 
                    1993 - 95                   Jun 2001            2005 
 
Note: The 1993-95 average data are from Lin (1997), the June 2001 data are from Guoji Shangbao 
(International Business Daily), Sept.7, 2001, and the 2005 data are from the 2005 Statistical Bulletin of 
China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment, the Ministry of Commerce, China. 
 
The sectoral distribution of China’s ODI is graphed in Figure 4. Two observations stand 
out – the growth of the trade and trade services sector and the fading importance of the 
manufacturing sector. Starting from a level below 20% in 1993-95, the share of the trade and 
trade services sector increased to above 60% in 2005. On the other hand, the share of the 
manufacturing sector dropped from a high 60% to the low teens during the same period. The 
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proportion of China’s ODI that goes to the resources exploration section in the new millennium 
is higher than that in the 1993-95 period. Nonetheless, the increase may not match the recent 
hype about China’s aggressiveness in securing natural resources around the world. In fact, the 
percentage of ODI in the resources exploration section is slightly above 15.1% in 2005 and is 
smaller than the level in 2001!  
 
2.3 Some  Data  Issues 
  Relative to inflows to China, there is a relatively few academic studies on China’s ODI. It 
is conceived that data paucity imposes a severe constraint on analyzing China’s ODI. China has 
only published its ODI data in a format that is consistent with the OECD and IMF standard since 
2003. The data are published in The Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. The Ministry of 
Commerce was formed in the spring of 2003 through re-organizing the former Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation. The relatively short sample period makes it difficult 
to assess the evolution of China’s ODI. 
In the current study, we consider an alternative data set that comprises data on China’s 
outward FDI approved by the authorities.  The approved ODI is the ODI originating from the 
Chinese enterprises that is approved by the Chinese government. Similar to most data on China, 
there are concerns about the accuracy of the approval data. For instance, the approved ODI data 
are different from the contracted or realized ODI data and they omit investment that does not go 
through the formal approval process. In general it is believed that these data understate China’s 
overseas investment.
6  
There are several reasons to consider the approval data published by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation in the annual 
publication “Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.” The Almanac has 
reported aggregate ODI data since 1984. The country-specific approved ODI data are available 
since 1991. Thus, the approval data offer a reasonably long time series to investigate the linkages 
between the Chinese overseas investment and the characteristics of its host countries.   
                                                 
6   The official approval data are subject to other issues including unauthorized capital flight, 
and “round tripping” that refers to capital that moves out of China and then invested back in 
China via, say,  Hong Kong. See, for example, Wong and Chan (2003). These problems also 
inflicted the Chinese official data on FDI from OECD (OECD, 2003).   9
Even though the Chinese ODI strategy is evolving towards a market-oriented approach, it 
is still to a great extent dictated by government directives. The ODI projects approved by the 
authorities, thus, reflect China’s policy stance and contain information on their determinants.  
Further, China has significant capital control. Despite the control is perceived to be porous, 
moving a significant amount of capital out of the country is not an ordinary task. Thus, while the 
approval data are likely to understate China’s overseas investment, they could offer some general 
information on reasons China is investing in overseas markets – especially given their relatively 
rich coverage of both host countries and time periods. 
As a robustness check, we will present results based on some other sources of ODI data 
in Section 4.  
 
3.   Empirical Determinants 
In this section we explore the determinants of China’s ODI. Why does China send its 
capital abroad? What are the host-country characteristics that attract China’s capital? Answers to 
these two questions depend on China’s motives. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, it is widely perceived that economic considerations are not 
the main motive behind China’s overseas investment in the pre-1990 era. Further, host-country 
specific data are available only after 1991. Thus our sample period is from 1991 to 2005. The 
country-specific approved ODI data were collected from the Almanac of China’s Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, various issues. Only data from the top 50 recipient countries as 
of 2005 are included in the sample.
7 We do not include all the recipient countries because China 
does not approve FDI to each one of them very year. Norway, for example, has not received any 
new approved ODI since 1991. The top 50 recipient countries, indeed, account for 90% of 
China’s ODI. Thus, we believe that the selected country sample offers a good representation of 
the approval data. 
 
3.1   A Benchmark Specification 
                                                 
7   These economies are listed in Appendix B. Three offshore financial centers – Bermuda, 
the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands are excluded. Myanmar is dropped because its 
GDP data are not available.   10
Our basic specification of China’s ODI behavior is  
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 it i it it it ODI GDP RGDPpc GDPG α μβ β β −− − =++ + + +  
4, 1 5 , 1 it it Wage Raw β β −− ++ 6, 1 7 , it t it Risk Trend β βε − + + .                                 (1) 
The dependent variable,  t i ODI , , is the host-country i’s stock of China’s ODI at time t normalized 
by the host-country’s population to facilitate comparison across countries of different sizes. The 
variable is expressed in logarithmic form. 
Three aspects of the market-seeking motive are captured by the explanatory variables 
GDP, RGDPpc, and GDPG. GDP is the ratio of the host-country’s gross domestic product to the 
Chinese gross domestic product; both measured in US dollars. It represents the (relative) market 
size offered to ODI (Frankel and Wei, 1996; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Wheeler and Mody, 1992). 
The Chinese output is used to construct the ratio because China is the source country in the 
current exercise. RGDPpc is the host-country’s real per capita income relative to China and is 
another commonly used indicator of market opportunities (Eaton and Tamura, 1994, 1996; 
Kinoshita and Campos, 2004; Lane, 2000; Lipsey, 1999). GDPG is the host-country’s real 
income growth rate. It is a measure of market growth potential (Billington, 1999; Lee, 2000; 
Lipsey, 1999). We expect these three variables to have a positive coefficient under the market-
seeking strategy. Data on these variables were drawn from the World Development Indicators 
database provided by the World Bank. A detailed description of the variables used in the study 
and their sources is given in Appendix C. 
Two endowment related variables, Wage and Raw, are included to account for the 
resources seeking motive (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Hatzius, 2000; Griffith-Joneses and Leape, 
2002; de Melo et al., 1997; Kinoshita and Campos, 2004). Wage is the host-country’s average 
wage in the manufacturing sector relative to the Chinese one. It represents the cost advantage. 
Raw is given by the host-country’s ratio of raw material exports (including fuels, ores, and 
metals) to its total merchandise exports and is a proxy for the abundance of natural resources. 
The data on Wage and Raw were retrieved, respectively, from the United Nations International 
Labor Organization Database and World Development Indicators. 
Both poor institutional environment and risk deter foreign investment (Hines, 1995; 
Lipsey, 1999; Wei and Shleifer, 2000; Wheeler and Mody, 1992). The effects of these factors are 
captured by the variable Risk, which is a summary index of institutional and risk characteristics.   11
It has 12 components including corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality, and 
socioeconomic conditions, and is provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
8 
To facilitate interpretation and avoid endogeneity issues, the lagged variables are used in 
the regression exercise. Besides these determinants, the host-country specific dummy variable  i μ  
is included to capture time invariant factors including the distance between China and the host 
country, the host-country’s geographic characters, and culture resemblances between countries.
9 
These time invariant factors are quite commonly included in the so-called “gravity” specification. 
The time trend dummy variable TREND captures trending behavior revealed in the figures. 
 
Table 1:  Determinants of China’s Overseas Direct Investment 
 Whole    Developing  Developed 
0.3400*** -0.3952  0.3414**  GDP  (0.1229) (0.6569) (0.1527) 
-0.1158** -0.0646  -0.2653***  RGDPpc  (0.0537) (0.0481) (0.0716) 
-0.0081 -0.0018 -0.0062  GDPG  (0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0319) 
-0.0005*** -0.0004*** 0.0033***  Wage  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0012) 
0.0432*** 0.0380***  0.0904  *  Raw  (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0473) 
-0.0055 0.0009 -0.0142  Risk  (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0207) 
1.5399*** 1.7859***  -1.2333  *  Trend  (0.3743) (0.4261) (0.6693) 
0.2469 0.4211 0.2168  Adj. R-squares 
Observations  367 234 133 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (1). The column labeled “Whole” gives 
results based on data from both developing and developed countries. The “Developing” and 
“Developed” columns, respectively, give results based on data from developing and developed 
countries. See the text for detail. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, “**” and 
“*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results pertaining to estimating (1) are presented in Table 1. In anticipating that the 
factors determining the flow of Chinese capital to developed countries are different from those to 
developing countries, we fitted the model to the entire sample, the sample comprises developed 
                                                 
8   Both exchange rate and exchange rate volatility variables were found to be insignificant 
in preliminary analyses. Thus, these variables were not included, for brevity. 
9   Technically speaking, our panel regressions allowed for fixed effects. The Hausman test 
rejected the specification with random effects in favor of the one with fixed effects.   12
countries, and the sample comprises developing countries. The effective numbers of observations 
used in the regression analyses are restricted by the availability of data on the explanatory 
variables. The reported results are based on a sample of 31 countries – 21 developing and 10 
developed countries.
10 The estimates are obtained using the feasible generalized least squares 
procedure to control for serial correlated residuals.
11 For brevity, the estimates of the constant 
and the host-country specific dummy variables ( i μ s) are not reported. 
The coefficient estimates are supportive of the conjecture that factors determining the 
Chinese capital going into developed and developing countries are not the same. Using estimates 
from the whole sample to assess China’s overseas investment strategy can lead to misleading 
inferences. The most obvious example is the trend estimates – the one for developed countries is 
significantly negative while those for the whole sample and for developing countries are 
significantly positive. Thus, we separately examine the estimates from developing and developed 
countries. 
For developing countries, all the three variables (GDP, RGDPpc, and GDPG) capturing 
various aspects of the market-seeking motive are negative and statistically insignificant. Market 
seeking does not seem to be a main reason for China to invest in these developing countries. 
The two endowment related variables Wage and Raw yield significant estimates that are 
consistent with the resources seeking motive – to go for low cost locations and to seek for natural 
resources. According to the MOFTEC Offshore Plant Project (2000), 22.5% of the surveyed 
Chinese enterprises considered “cheap labor” in other developing countries is one of the most 
attractive factors for investing abroad. A few years later, however, another study reports that the 
surveyed Chinese enterprises assigned a relatively low score for the “access to low cost labour” 
as a driving factor for current Chinese ODI (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2005). 
Regarding the Raw result, it is interesting to note that, in two recent surveys, the Chinese 
enterprises played down the role of “access to natural resources” as a driving factor for current 
Chinese ODI and “to secure access to energy, raw materials and natural resources” as an 
important factor of ODI decision (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2005, 2006). 
                                                 
10   Among the 19 countries excluded from the 50-country sample, 16 have no data on Wage, 
5 have no data on Risk, and 2 have no data on Raw. 
11   Specifically, serial correlation was corrected using country-specific serial correlation 
patterns. Unless stated otherwise, estimation results are corrected for serial correlation. Baltagi et 
al. (2007), for example, offers a recent assessment of serial correlation adjustment methods.   13
Apparently, China’s ODI is quite insensitive to the host-country’s risk characteristics – 
the Risk variable is not significant. The coefficient estimate of Trend is positive and is in 
accordance with the pattern revealed in Figure 2; China’s ODI to these countries is increasing 
over time beyond the level predicted by the economic variables included in the regression. 
The results for developed countries are quite different. First, the GDP variable is 
significantly positive – China’s ODI tends to go to a large market as measured by its income 
level. The per capita income variable RGDPpc, however, has a significantly negative estimate. It 
is noted that a large proportion of China’s ODI is in the trade and trade services sector that 
facilitates China’s exports to the host country and most Chinese exports are not of a high-end 
market nature. Apparently, the negative RGDPpc estimate attests to the market focus of China’s 
ODI operations – most of them are geared towards low income rather than high income 
customers. The host-country’s growth, GDPG, which is our third market-seeking variable, is not 
a significant factor. 
 Both the Wage and Raw variables are significantly positive for the developed countries. 
While the Raw estimate is consistent with the resources seeking motive, the Wage estimate is 
different from the cost advantage interpretation. Indeed, the different Wage estimates are 
suggestive of the possibility that China has different reasons to invest in developing and 
developed countries. While developing countries offer cost advantages, developed countries have 
advanced technologies and management methods, which are usually associated with higher 
wages. Indeed, according to a recent survey of the Chinese enterprises, “to acquire advanced 
technology” and “to learn advanced management methods” are amongst the most important 
factors of their ODI decisions (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2006). Thus, the positive 
Wage estimate for developed countries is in accordance with the motive to gain access to 
advanced technologies and management know-how via overseas investment.  
Similar to the case of developing countries, China’s investment in developed countries is 
not affected by their risk characteristics – the Risk variable is not significant. The negative trend 
estimate mirrors the developed countries’ declining share of China’s ODI. 
In sum, the results in Table 1 identify some economic determinants of China’s ODI and 
show that these determinants have different effects for developed and developing countries. 
According to the adjusted R-squares, the selected variables explain the data on ODI in 
developing countries better than those in developed countries.   14
In Section 2.1, it is noted that China’s overseas investment policy has undergone some 
changes since 1991. There are two notable policy changes – one took place after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and the other one is the launch of the “going global” strategy in 2002. In view of 
these changes, we introduce two dummy variables, D98t ≡ I(t ≥ 1998) and D02t ≡ I(t ≥ 2002), 
where I(.) is an indicator function. The two dummy variables are interacted with the explanatory 
variables Raw and Trend to investigate the implications of policy changes for seeking natural 
resources in particular and for promoting overseas investment in general. Thus, we modify 
equation (1) to 
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 4 ,1 it i it it it it ODI GDP RGDPpc GDPG Wage α μβ β β β −− − − =++ + + + +  
5, 1 it Raw β − + 6, 1 7, 1 8 , 1 98 * 02 * t it t it it DR a w DR a w R i s k β ββ −− − + ++  
9 t Trend β + 10 11 , 98 * 02 * tt tt i t D Trend D Trend β βε + + .     (2) 
The results of estimating (2) are presented in Table 2. In general, the inclusion of these 
interaction variables improves the goodness-of-fit. The specification for developed countries 
displays the best improvement - its adjusted R-squares estimate increases more than double from 
21.68% to 51.56%. 
The interaction variables reveal some interesting information. For the whole sample, the 
Raw variable maintains its significance and the interaction term  02* D Raw is significantly 
negative. One possible interpretation is that the “going global” policy is not biased in favour of 
ODI projects that secure natural resources and, thus, lowers the relative importance of the Raw 
related investment. The estimates for developing countries are similar to those for the whole 
sample. The data from developed countries tell a slightly different story – the  02* D Raw factor 
is the only significant variable. Thus, there is evidence that China has increased its effort in 
securing natural resources in developed countries since 2002. 
The coefficient estimates of Trend and its interaction variables appear consistent with the 
evolution of China’s ODI described in Section 2.1. For developing countries, the Trend, 
89* DT r e n d , and  02* DT r e n d variables are all significantly positive – indicating that, in 
stepping up its effort to invest abroad, China has consistently increased its involvement in 
developing countries. Similar to the result in Table 1, the Trend variable has a negative effect for 
developed countries. The interaction term  02* DT r e n d , however, is significantly positive, and 
mitigates the overall negative trending effect. The “going global” policy appears to be an across-  15
the-board strategy to promote China’s ODI and benefits both developing and developed 
countries. 
 
Table 2:  Determinants of China’s Overseas Direct Investment, with interaction variables 
 Whole    Developing  Developed 
0.2171** -0.3488 0.2650  *  GDP  (0.1052) (0.6454) (0.1426) 
-0.0435 -0.0337  -0.2751***  RGDPpc  (0.0440) (0.0333) (0.1028) 
0.0038 0.0094 0.0203  GDPG  (0.0076) (0.0099) (0.0270) 
-0.0007*** -0.0006*** 0.0061***  Wage  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) 
0.0438** 0.0410**  0.0494  Raw  (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0466) 
-0.0077 0.0023 -0.0136  Risk  (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0133) 
0.0007 0.0039 -0.0138  D98*Raw  (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0295) 
-0.0124 *  -0.0125 *  0.1023 *  D02*Raw  (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0551) 
0.8445*** 0.9698*** -2.6607**  Trend  (0.2233) (0.2883) (1.1476) 
0.0955*** 0.1231**  0.0483  D98*Trend  (0.0366) (0.0584) (0.0664) 
0.3038*** 0.2859***  0.2282  *  D02*Trend  (0.0510) (0.0625) (0.1288) 
Adj.  R-squares  0.3721 0.4500 0.5156 
Observations  367 234 133 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (2). The column labeled “Whole” gives 
results based on data from both developing and developed countries. The “Developing” and 
“Developed” columns, respectively, give results based on data from developing and developed 
countries. See the text for detail. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, “**” and 
“*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In passing, we note that the inclusion of interaction variables does not have a qualitative 
impact on other coefficient estimates for either developing or developed countries. 
  
3.2 An  Extended  Specification 
In this subsection, we augment specification (1) with three variables that are deemed 
relevant for China’s overseas investment policy. The three variables are China’s exports to the   16
host country, China’s level of international reserves, and the existing level of investment in the 
host country. The first two variables reflect the push effects derived from China’s own policies 
and the last one is related to the agglomeration or herding phenomenon. 
Over time, China has an increasing share of its overseas investment in the trade and trade 
services sector, which includes a) wholesale and retail operations, and b) business, transportation 
and storage services that handle China’s exports. Indeed, by the end of 2005, 61.2% of China’s 
ODI stock was in this sector. Apparently, a component of China’s overseas investment policy is 
to go with its exports. After the Asian financial crisis, for instance, China issued a directive that 
encourages ODI projects, which promote its exports. To investigate the implication of China’s 
export activity, we construct a variable XShare, which is given by the Chinese exports to the 
host-country normalized by the world’s total exports to the host-country. We expect the variable 
to have a positive coefficient if (part of) ODI is deployed to service exports.
12 The trade data 
were retrieved from the Directions of Trade database provided by the International Monetary 
Fund. 
The rapid accumulation of international reserves, especially during the new millennium, 
has created some policy issues for the Chinese authorities. Some countries – the US may be the 
most vocal one – have criticized China for hoarding an excessive amount of international 
reserves and, thus, creating severe global imbalances. Excessive international reserves are also a 
potential source of domestic economic turmoil. Recently, the Chinese government has pursued a 
number of initiatives to alleviate the adverse effect of a high level of international reserves. One 
initiative is to encourage both state-owned and private enterprises to invest abroad via ODI and 
portfolio investment. Other initiatives include allowing Chinese corporations to keep overseas 
earnings outside China and setting up a sovereign wealth fund to manage part of its international 
reserves. To investigate the effect of China’s international reserve holding on its ODI, we 
consider the variable Reserve, given by the ratio of China’s total international reserves to its 
gross domestic product. The data on international reserves are taken from the World 
Development Indicators database. 
                                                 
12   Lipsey and Weiss (1984) and Eaton and Tamura (1994) report the complimentary 
relationship between FDI and exports. In the current study, we use the lagged XShare variable in 
the regression analysis to isolate the XShare effect.     17
The third variable captures the so-called agglomeration effect. Krugman (1997), for 
example, points out that FDI tends to follow previous investment. Facing uncertainties, investors 
infer direct and indirect signals from past decisions made by other investors in foreign countries. 
If an investor sees his country already has a considerable amount of investment in a foreign 
country, then he is likely to invest in that country – either to take advantage of experiences 
accumulated by his peers or set up his business among people with whom he is familiar.
13  To 
capture the effect of mimicking previous investment decisions, we introduce the ratio of China’s 
ODI to a host country to China’s total ODI and label it Aggl. Under the agglomeration 
hypothesis, Aggl is expected to have a positive coefficient; that is, a host country that already has 
a large share of China’s ODI is likely to attract new Chinese capital.  
With the three added explanatory variables, equations (1) and (2) are modified to  
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 4 ,1 5 ,1 it i it it it it it ODI GDP RGDPpc GDPG Wage Raw α μβ β β β β −− − − − =++ + + + + +  
              6, 1 7 1 , 1 2 1 3 , 1 , it t it t it it Risk Trend XShare Reserve Aggl β βγ γ γ ε −− − − ++ + + + ,        (3) 
and 
, 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 4 ,1 it i it it it it ODI GDP RGDPpc GDPG Wage α μβ β β β −− − − =++ + + + +  
5, 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8, 1 98 * 02 * it t it t it it Raw D Raw D Raw Risk β βββ −−− − +++ +  
91 0 1 1 98 * 02 * tt tt t Trend D Trend D Trend β ββ +++  
1, 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 98 * 02 * it t it t it XShare D XShare D XShare γ γγ −−− +++  
41 5 1 6 1 98 * 02 * tt tt t Reserve D Reserve D Reserve γ γγ −−− +++  
7, 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 , 98 * 02 * it t it t it it Aggl D Aggl D Aggl γ γγε −−− +++ .     (4) 
The results of estimating (3) and (4) are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Given the 
significance of interaction terms, we make only a few brief remarks on Table 3 and offer a more 
detailed discussion of Table 4. In Table 3, with the exception of the XShare variable for 
developed countries, the three added variables are all positively significant. The inclusion of 
these three variables improves the overall performance of the model; the estimated models have 
a noticeable increase in their adjusted R-squares estimates. The results attest to the relevance of 
these factors in determining China’s overseas investment decisions. 
                                                 
13   In the literature, reasons for agglomeration include knowledge spillovers, advantage of 
specialized factors, and linkages between customers and suppliers (Krugman, 1997; Krugman 
and Venables, 1995, 1996). See, also, Head et al. (1995) and Wheeler and Mody (1992).   18
Table 3:  An Augmented China’s Overseas Direct Investment Specification 
 Whole    Developing  Developed 
0.0619 0.3330  0.3826  *  GDP  (0.0806) (0.4560) (0.2239) 
0.0236 0.0762  * -0.3606  RGDPpc  (0.0319) (0.0407) (0.2335) 
-0.0121 -0.0078 -0.0169  GDPG  (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0256) 
-0.0004*** -0.0002**  0.0019  *  Wage  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0011) 
0.0234 *  0.0207 *  0.0542  Raw  (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0465) 
-0.0150*** -0.0037  -0.0302  Risk  (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0222) 
1.2576*** 2.1429***  -2.5160  Trend  (0.2449) (0.3397) (2.0855) 
5.3420** 5.3375** -38.6226  XShare  (2.2803) (2.5362)  (35.3132) 
5.3169*** 2.9204  * 7.1587***  Reserve  (1.2463) (1.5655) (1.8873) 
4.5294*** 4.7214***  10.2120***  Aggl  (1.1910) (1.8053) (3.8470) 
Adj.  R-squares  0.4051 0.6161 0.4037 
Observations  376 243 133 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (3), which includes the augmented 
variables XShare, Reserve, and Aggl. The column labeled “Whole” gives results based on data 
from both developing and developed countries. The “Developing” and “Developed” columns, 
respectively, give results based on data from developing and developed countries. See the text 
for detail. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, “**” and “*” denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The interaction variables in Table 4 offer some specific information about the effects of 
the three added variables. Again, the differences between the results for developed and 
developing countries are quite obvious. The results pertaining to XShare, D98* XShare, and 
D02* XShare indicate that the share of Chinese exports displays a strong positive effect after the 
Asian financial crisis for developing countries but an insignificantly negative effect for 
developed countries. The positive effect has gained further momentum since 2002.  
The differential XShare effect is likely attributable to market structures and channels 
through which China exports its goods and services. Conceivably, China does not have to spend 
much effort in servicing its exports to developed countries, which usually have a relatively good   19
Table 4:   An Augmented China’s Overseas Direct Investment Specification,  
with interaction variables 
  Whole    Developing  Developed 
0.1673 *  0.0455  0.1549 *  GDP 
(0.0954) (0.4869) (0.0889) 
-0.0087 0.0924*** -0.2350  RGDPpc 
(0.0365) (0.0347) (0.2004) 
-0.0074 0.0087 0.0186  GDPG 
(0.0082) (0.0103) (0.0291) 
-0.0005*** -0.0005***  0.0011  Wage 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0022) 
0.0305 *  0.0115  0.0441  Raw 
(0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0713) 
-0.0019 0.0115 0.0226  D98*Raw 
(0.0181) (0.0147) (0.0381) 
-0.0211*** -0.0148  **  -0.0327  D02*Raw 
(0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0436) 
-0.0025 -0.0023  -0.0542  ** 
Risk 
(0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0254) 
0.8560*** 1.0153***  -1.1266  Trend 
(0.2956) (0.2792) (2.3934) 
0.0316 0.0256  0.4346  *  D98*Trend 
  (0.0496) (0.0722) (0.2620) 
0.0911 0.1164  * 0.0937  D02*Trend 
  (0.0621) (0.0677) (0.1650) 
0.0683 -5.5738  -29.1614  XShare 
(3.5412) (4.3088)  (30.9261) 
-2.3133 6.9324  ** -2.5050  D98*XShare 
(1.5932) (3.2317) (6.7531) 
3.0170 10.2222***  -10.1022  D02*XShare 
(3.2361) (3.8911)  (11.6359) 
-0.1599 -0.7287 -0.6038  Reserve 
(1.1056) (1.7250) (3.5593) 
2.3706 2.0529 -9.4953  D98*Reserve 
(1.5576) (2.0151) (7.4216) 
4.3220  ** 1.9467 14.9865  *  D02*Reserve 
(1.7614) (1.7768) (8.8401) 
11.5792*** 33.3347*** 16.8765***  Aggl 
(2.6537) (8.5776) (5.0529) 
1.3921 -13.4679  **  6.6309  **  D98*Aggl  (2.1282) (6.3053) (2.6525) 
-9.9225*** -19.2420***  -8.3877  D02*Aggl  (2.2906) (5.5641)  (10.2744) 
Adj. R-squares  0.5774  0.6973  0.5727 
Observations 367  234  133 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (4), which includes the augmented variables XShare, 
Reserve, Aggl, and the related interaction terms. The column labeled “Whole” gives results based on data from both 
developing and developed countries. The “Developing” and “Developed” columns, respectively, give results based 
on data from developing and developed countries. See the text for detail. Robust standard errors are in the 
parentheses. “***”, “**” and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   20
infrastructure and distribution network. Further, China’s exports to developed countries are 
usually procured by big corporations (e.g. Wal-Mart in the US). On the other hand, given their 
relatively remote market conditions, China has to invest to penetrate markets in developing 
countries.
 14  This suggests that ODI has to be deployed to support and service exports to 
developing countries and, thus, ODI increases with the trade share. Further, the presence of a 
significant XShare effect coincides with the policy changes discussed earlier. 
  The interaction variable D02*Reserve isolates the significant effect of international 
reserves in the post-2002 period for the whole sample and the subsample of developed countries. 
The result corroborates the view that China’s rapid build-up of international reserves makes the 
“promotion of outward FDI an imperative for the Chinese Government” (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 55). 
The international reserves factor, however, has only tangential implications for decisions on 
investing in developing countries. The developing countries have positive coefficient estimates 
for D98*Reserve and D02*Reserve, but these estimates are not statistically significant.  
 The  agglomeration  variables  Aggl, D98*Aggl, and D02*Aggl show an interesting pattern. 
The significantly positive Aggl indicates that, in general, the Chinese overseas investment tends 
to follow the footsteps of previous decisions – the host-country that has a larger share of China’s 
ODI tends to receive more Chinese capital. It is true for both developed and developing countries 
despite the difference in the magnitudes of the effect. 
Since the Asian financial crisis, there seems to have been a policy shift. For developing 
countries, the agglomeration or herding behaviour has been weakened since 1998 – both 
D98*Aggl and D02*Aggl have a significantly negative coefficient estimate. Indeed, the 
combined effect of Aggl, D98*Aggl, and D02*Aggl is quite close to zero. In checking the data, it 
is found that, between 1991 and 2005, the number of developing countries receiving China’s 
ODI increases quite steadily – 85 in 1991, 124 in 1997, 134 in 2001, and 147 in 2005. Further, in 
plotting the data we observe that the ODI distribution across, say, the 38 recipient countries 
(Hong Kong and Macau are not included) in the sample is spreading out over time.
15 While 
increasing its presence in developing countries, China is spreading its investment across these 
                                                 
14   Indeed, for developed countries, the correlation between China’s ODI and XShare is at a 
rather weak level of 0.125 and, for developing countries, the correlation is 0.565. 
15   These plots and those for developed countries discussed later are given in Appendix A.   21
countries. Instead of agglomerating its investment, China appears to be diversifying and 
spreading its investment across these developing countries. 
  The developed countries reveal a different picture. The D98*Aggl variable is still 
significantly positive and the D02*Aggl variable is negative but insignificant. Thus, the Chinese 
capital further clusters among developed countries that already have a large share of China’s 
ODI in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Even though the interaction variable D02*Aggl  is 
not significant, the sign of its coefficient estimate indicates that there is a change in the dynamics. 
Indeed, the plots of ODI show that, across the 10 developing countries in the sample, the 
distribution is quite stable between 1991 and 2001 and displays a higher degree of dispersion in 
2005. Using the sum of the coefficient estimates of Aggl, D98*Aggl and D02*Aggl  to gauge the 
overall effect, we see that the agglomeration effect went up in the post-1997 period and then 
roughly reversed back to its previous level after 2002. Thus, at the end of our sample period, 
agglomeration is still a relevant element for making ODI decisions in developed countries but 
not for ODI decisions in developing countries. 
  In passing, we note that the inclusion of XShare, Reserve, Aggl and the related interaction 
variables has some implications for the coefficient estimates reported in Table 2. For developing 
countries, RGDPpc becomes significantly positive, Raw insignificant, and D98*Trend 
insignificant. For developed countries, the coefficient estimates of RGDPpc, Wage, D02*Raw, 
Risk, and the trend related variables experience changes. One impression is that the Trend and 
the related interaction variables are playing a less important role in the presence of the added 
economic variables. 
 
4. Additional  Analyses 
4.1  Natural Resources Seeking Motive 
China’s (attempted) acquisitions of operations in the area of natural resources have drawn 
considerable attention from the media and policy circle. Strong economic growth is the main 
driver behind China’s move to secure raw materials and oil around the world. As a relatively 
new outward investor in natural resources, it is not easy for China to set up its foothold in 
established and conventional locations. Indeed, China is perceived to direct its investment to 
geographically and/or politically sensitive regions, including Africa, for natural resources. Such a   22
natural resources procurement policy is deemed to be aggressive and can alter the global 
economic and political balances.
16 
 We investigate whether China’s ODI is overwhelmingly geared towards natural 
resources in Africa and in oil-producing countries. To proceed, we drop the Wage variable and 
introduce a few interaction dummy variables. By dropping the Wage variable, we have 10 
instead of 2 African countries in the analysis. The zero-one dummy variables DAfr and DOil are 
constructed for the African and oil-producing countries. The Fuelx variable given by the ratio of 
a host-country’s fuel exports to its total merchandise exports is included as an alternative to the 
aggregate resource variable Raw. The interaction variables Raw*DAfr, D98*Raw*DAfr, and 
D02*Raw*DAfr are used to examine the behavior towards natural resources in African countries. 
The interaction variables Fuelx*DOil, D98* Fuelx*DOil, and D02*Fuelx*DOil are used to 
assess results specific to oil-producing countries. The fuel seeking motive in Africa is studied 
using Fuelx*DAfr, D98* Fuelx*DAfr and D02*Fuelx*DAfr. 
Table 5 reports the effects of these interaction dummy variables. The results of adding 
Raw*DAfr, D98*Raw*DAfr, and D02*Raw*DAfr to (and excluding Wage from) equation (4) are 
presented under the column labeled “African.” Among the three added variables, Raw*DAfr and 
D98*Raw*DAfr are significant with different signs. The negative coefficient estimate of 
Raw*DAfr is inconsistent with the perception that China goes to Africa for natural resources. 
D98*Raw*DAfr, on the other hand, has a positive coefficient. The result is indicative of the 
possibility that China has been playing catch-up in procuring natural resources and the 
investment in Africa has been shifted towards countries with rich raw materials since 1998. The 
overall effect as given by the sum of the coefficient estimates of Raw*DAfr and D98*Raw*DAfr, 
however, is still negative. Even though the adjusted R-squares estimate is not directly 
comparable to the one in Table 4 because of the difference in sample sizes and the exclusion of 
the Wage variable, it is noted that the estimate is smaller in Table 5. 
 
                                                 
16   For instance, there are concerns about China's “predation” of Africa's oil resources and 
the so-called "economic colonialism" (People's Daily Online, 2006). For alternative views on 
Sino-African relationships, see Downs (2007), Evans and Downs (2006), and Wang (2007). To 
be sure, there is a general concern about the increasing procurement of natural resources from 
emerging markets (The Economist, 2006). UNCTAD (2006), for example, examines the increase 
in FDI from developing economies.    23
Table 5:    Natural Resources Seeking in African and Oil-Producing Countries 
African    Fuel/African    Fuel/Oil-Producing 
0.2014 *    0.2146**    0.1626 *  GDP 
(0.1096)   
GDP 
(0.1079)   
GDP 
(0.0973) 
-0.0375    -0.0365    -0.0359  RGDPpc 
(0.0297)   
RGDPpc 
(0.0296)   
RGDPpc 
(0.0283) 
-0.0020    -0.0032    -0.0026  GDPG 
(0.0062)   
GDPG 
(0.0061)   
GDPG 
(0.0060) 
0.0165    0.0299***    0.0781***  Raw 
(0.0133)   
Fuelx 
(0.0110)   
Fuelx 
(0.0248) 
-0.0044    -0.0073**    -0.0337**  D98*Raw 
(0.0042)   
D98*Fuelx 
(0.0034)   
D98*Fuelx 
(0.0132) 
0.0002    0.0016    -0.0011  D02*Raw 
(0.0035)   
D02* Fuelx 
(0.0034)   
D02* Fuelx 
(0.0125) 
-0.0439 *    -0.0547**    -0.0742***  Raw*DAfr 
(0.0232)   
Fuelx *DAfr 
(0.0225)   
Fuelx *DOil 
(0.0249) 
0.0320**    0.0301**    0.0289**  D98*Raw*DAfr  (0.0155)    D98* Fuelx *DAfr  (0.0122)    D98* Fuelx *DOil  (0.0122) 
-0.0022    0.0066    0.0040  D02*Raw*DAfr  (0.0076)    D02* Fuelx *DAfr  (0.0136)    D02* Fuelx *DOil  (0.0121) 
-0.0073 *    -0.0085**    -0.0067  Risk  (0.0044)    Risk  (0.0040)    Risk  (0.0047) 
0.9938***    0.9779***    0.9080***  Trend 
(0.1759)   
Trend 
(0.1686)   
Trend 
(0.1653) 
-0.0389    -0.0333    -0.0547  D98*Trend 
  (0.0500)   
D98*Trend 
  (0.0494)   
D98*Trend 
  (0.0473) 
0.0792 *    0.0784 *    0.0845 *  D02*Trend 
  (0.0490)   
D02*Trend 
  (0.0472)   
D02*Trend 
  (0.0469) 
4.5732    5.1147    4.8425  XShare 
(3.5319)   
XShare 
(3.1816)   
XShare 
(3.4409) 
-2.7951    -3.3744**    -3.5266 *  D98*XShare 
(1.7547)   
D98*XShare 
(1.6545)   
D98*XShare 
(1.8306) 
2.0866    3.6463    1.8546  D02*XShare 
(2.6588)   
D02*XShare 
(2.5921)   
D02*XShare 
(2.8449) 
1.0120    0.9415    0.6351  Reserve 
(1.0004)   
Reserves 
(0.9567)   
Reserves 
(1.1146) 
2.4220**    3.2937***    4.1078***  D98*Reserve 
(1.1927)   
D98*Reserves 
(1.2255)   
D98*Reserves 
(1.3146) 
1.5771    0.4491    0.6526  D02*Reserve 
(1.4949)   
D02*Reserves 
(1.5061)   
D02*Reserves 
(1.4781) 
12.4068***    12.5090***    10.3204***  Aggl 
(2.1806)   
Aggl 
(2.0610)   
Aggl 
(2.3113) 
-0.3648    -0.9203    0.3594  D98*Aggl  (1.7378)    D98*Aggl  (1.6283)    D98*Aggl  (1.8475) 
-8.4658***    -8.6840***    -6.6989***  D02*Aggl  (2.2540)    D02*Aggl  (2.1686)    D02*Aggl  (2.5363) 
Adj. R-squares  0.5556    Adj. R-squares  0.5859    Adj. R-squares  0.5536 
Observations 527    Observations 527    Observations 527 
Note: The table assesses the China’s motive of seeking natural resources via outward investment in African 
and oil-producing countries. See the text for the definitions of DAfr, DOil, Fuelx, and the related interaction 
variables. The Wage is dropped to increase the sample size. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, 
“**” and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   24
The column labeled “Fuel/African” gives the results when the Raw variable is replaced 
by the variable Fuelx. The significance of the Fuelx variable supports the view that fuel 
procurement is a factor determining China’s ODI activity. However, the motive is not getting 
stronger over time – in fact the interaction variable D98* Fuelx is significantly negative; 
indicating a weakening effect. 
Interestingly, Fuelx*DAfr assumes a significantly negative coefficient estimate and D98* 
Fuelx*DAfr has a significantly positive one – the sum of the two coefficient estimates is negative. 
The evidence, again, does not square with the perception that China goes to Africa for natural 
resources – in this case, for fuel. 
The column labeled “Fuel/Oil-producing” is a variation of the one labeled “Fuel/African” 
with DAfr replaced by the DOil dummy variable. Interchanging these two dummy variables does 
not alter the corresponding coefficient estimates qualitatively. Similar to the case of African 
countries, the results do not support the view that there is a “disproportionately” large amount of 
China’s capital that targets the natural resource “fuel” in oil-producing countries. 
In sum, there is only limited evidence that the exports of natural resources from the 
African and oil-producing countries attract an extra amount of direct investment from China. 
China’s ODI in African and oil-producing countries does not appear overly tilted towards natural 
resources. The natural resources seeking motive, apparently, is just one of many reasons to invest 
in these countries. Indeed, the ODI interests of the Chinese enterprises extend beyond resources 
and energy projects – the top attractive areas are manufacturing, information technology 
products and services, and trading (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2005, 2006). 
There is a caveat. While the coefficient estimates of Fuelx*DAfr and Fuelx*DOil are 
negative, those associated with the D98 and D02 interaction variables are positive. An alternative 
interpretation of these findings is that China is catching up with its natural resources seeking 
ODI projects in these countries. Our sample period ends at 2005 and does not reflect the most 
recent Chinese efforts to secure natural resources that have received considerable media attention. 
In this case, more data are required to determine the behavior of China’s ODI in these countries. 
 
4.2  Excluding the Wage Variable 
The paucity of data on Wage imposes the most binding restriction on the country sample 
used in Section 3. The constraint mainly affects the number of developing countries. If we drop   25
the Wage variable, then we add 12 more developing countries to the sample. Table 6 gives the 
results of estimating equation (4) with the extended sample without the Wage variable. 
 
Table 6:  The China’s Overseas Direct Investment Equation without the Wage Variable  
  Whole Developing   
0.2220** 0.3480  GDP 
(0.1104) (0.5036) 
-0.0418 0.0632**  RGDPpc 
(0.0296) (0.0273) 
-0.0012 0.0002  GDPG 
(0.0060) (0.0074) 
0.0039 0.0002  Raw 
(0.0070) (0.0068) 
-0.0026 -0.0004  D98*Raw 
(0.0041) (0.0053) 
-0.0014 0.0019  D02*Raw 
(0.0036) (0.0029) 








0.0766 *  0.0623 
D02*Trend 
(0.0439) (0.0472) 
4.7450 0.1625  XShare 
(3.4228) (3.9274) 
-3.0119 *  3.6325  D98*XShare 
(1.6808) (2.3678) 
2.0761 4.7055  *  D02*XShare 
(2.5941) (2.8103) 
0.8875 0.2040  Reserve 
(1.0084) (1.4537) 
2.3433** 3.3759**  D98*Reserve 
(1.2028) (1.4744) 
1.8503 -0.4168  D02*Reserve 
(1.4379) (1.4534) 
12.6405*** 27.3350***  Aggl 
(2.2196) (8.4307) 
-0.7819 -9.8328**  D98*Aggl  (1.7542) (4.8429) 
-8.3826*** -13.4451**  D02*Aggl  (2.2825) (6.2612) 
Adj. R-squares  0.5515  0.6835 
Observations 527  388 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (4) without the Wage Variable. The column labeled 
“Whole” gives results based on data from both developing and developed countries. The “Developing” gives 
results based on data from developing. The results for developed countries are essentially the same as those in 
Table 2. See the text for detail. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, “**” and “*” denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   26
For brevity, the results for the developed countries are not reported because, as expected, 
they are very similar to those in Table (4). Some changes for the results pertaining to data from 
developing countries are noted: D02*RAW becomes insignificant, D98*Xshare is still positive 
but insignificant, D98*Reserve becomes significant, and D02*Trend loses its significance. These 
changes, however, do not substantially alter the general picture of the behavior of China’s ODI. 
 
4.3  Alternative Sources of ODI data 
  Since 2003, China has published ODI data according to the IMF-OECD format. At the 
time of preparing the current study, these IMF-OECD style data are available for three years; 
namely 2003, 2004, and 2005.  
The results of fitting these data to equation (3) are presented in Panel A of Table 7. Most 
of the estimates are insignificant. It is noted, however, that the number of observations is quite 
small. Again, the sample size is limited by the paucity of data on Wage. Similar to what we did 
in the previous subsection, we increased the country sample by excluding the Wage variable. In 
view of the limited time dimension of the dataset, we further dropped the insignificant Trend 
variable. The results estimated from the expanded sample are given in Panel B. The whole 
sample gives a significantly positive GDP effect. Similar to Table 3, the XShare, Reserve, and 
Aggl variables have a positive impact on China’s ODI. The results for developing and developed 
countries are also comparable to those in Table 3 – the main exception is that, for developed 
countries, the Reserve variable has a negative, though insignificant, estimate.
17 
  In passing, we mention that we also estimated equation (4) using China’s ODI data that 
are reported by the receiving OECD countries and available from the SourceOECD database. 
Due to data limitations, we ended up with 7 developed and 3 developing countries in the sample. 
We deemed the number of developing countries is too small to reveal cross-country variations 
and, thus, used only data from developed countries. The estimation results, which are available 
from the authors, are similar to those for developed countries reported in Table 4. The main 
differences are, for these selected OECD developed countries, a) the Wage, D98*Reserve, and 
D02*Aggl variables are statistically significant, and b) the GDPG variable is significantly 
negative. 
                                                 
17   Cheng and Ma (2009) fits a gravity-type equation to these three years of data. Note that 
the country-specific dummy variables in our specification capture time invariant effects.   27
Table 7:  The China’s Overseas Direct Investment Equation – An Alternative Data Source 
  Whole  Developing   Developed  
Panel A     
0.6389 *  18.2407  -0.5105  GDP  (0.3662) (16.3719) (0.6355) 
-0.1774 -1.0379 -0.0491  RGDPpc  (0.1360) (0.8254) (0.2733) 
0.0701 0.0958 0.0297  GDPG  (0.0474) (0.1052) (0.1269) 
0.0091 0.6601 0.0047  Wage  (0.0098) (0.7229) (0.0057) 
0.0432 -0.0148 0.0615  Raw  (0.0320) (0.0736) (0.0760) 
0.0813 0.1056 -0.0316  Risk 
(0.0528) (0.0820) (0.0556) 
-0.5498 0.1236 0.1087  Trend  (2.1802) (4.9784) (2.7544) 
23.7449 **  32.5584 *  1.7704  XShare  (8.4813) (15.3697)  (22.2235) 
4.3335 1.5204 -0.9752  Reserve  (22.0537) (50.1933) (29.5455) 
19.8168 **  25.5190   549.1461 **  Aggl  (8.6648) (13.3713)  (126.8308) 
Adj. R-squares  0.7723 0.8014 0.9275 
Observations  54 30 24 
     
Panel B     
-0.0888 0.7725 0.2918  GDP  (0.3817) (4.7270) (0.3098) 
0.2539 **  0.6038  -0.2636  RGDPpc  (0.1165) (0.3814) (0.1596) 
-0.0226 -0.0292  * 0.0157  GDPG  (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0470) 
-0.0027 -0.0023 0.0112  Raw  (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0207) 
0.0510 0.0483 0.0263  Risk  (0.0360) (0.0420) (0.0235) 
25.1330 **  26.4219 **  12.4863  XShare  (10.7382) (12.3850) (19.2589) 
7.6416*** 8.2744***  -2.4844  Reserve  (2.0569) (2.3969) (3.9121) 
24.9875 **  22.5073 **  258.2925***  Aggl  (9.8843) (9.8927)  (62.0990) 
Adj. R-squares  0.4521 0.4448 0.8126 
Observations  114 84  30 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equation (3) using three years of ODI data complied 
according to the IMF-OECD standard. Panel B excludes the Wage variables to increase the sample size. 
The insignificant Trend is also dropped. The column labeled “Whole” gives results based on data from 
both developing and developed countries. The “Developing” and “Developed” columns, respectively, 
give results based on data from developing and developed countries. See the text for detail. Robust 
standard errors are in the parentheses. “***”, “**” and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.   28
In sum, the estimates derived from these two alternative sources of China’s ODI data are 
quite comparable, even though not identical, to those from the official data on approved ODI. 
Specifically, the variables XShare, Reserve, and Aggl, and their interaction terms display very 
similar effects in these regressions. In passing, we note that the UNCTAD World Investment 
Report is another FDI data source; nonetheless, we did not obtain the host-country specific data. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
There is a plethora of studies on China as one of the top recipients of international capital. 
At the same time, the role of China as a global capital provider has received little attention. 
Admittedly, China’s overseas investment is quite small compared with both the size of its 
economy and the investment levels of other top outward investors. China’s ODI, nonetheless, has 
been growing quite rapidly in the last few years. In 2005, China ranked 27
th among all the 
outward investors and 4
th among developing countries excluding offshore finance centers 
(UNCTAD, 2006) and was perceived to be an important source of financing for developing 
countries in the near future. Thus, it is of both academic and policy interest to systematically 
examine China’s ODI behavior. 
In this exercise, we investigate the empirical determinants of China’s ODI. The 
determinants include those drawn from extant theory on overseas investment and those deemed 
relevant to China’s circumstances. We also anticipate that China’s investments in developed and 
developing countries are driven by different (policy) factors. 
The empirical findings confirm that China displays different types of investment behavior 
across developed and developing countries. Subject to the differences between developed and 
developing countries, the results suggest that a) the presence of the market seeking and resources 
seeking motives, b) the Chinese exports to developing countries tend to induce China’s ODI, c) 
the recent surge in the Chinese holding of foreign exchange reserves promotes its ODI in 
developed countries, and d) the Chinese capital displays different types of agglomeration 
behavior across developed and developing countries. The interaction variables included in the 
regression analysis attest to the changes in China’s overseas investment policy. We do not find 
substantial evidence that China mainly invests in African and oil-producing countries for natural 
resources. Even though it is encouraging to observe that alternative ODI data sources yield   29
similar results, we are aware of the uncertainty about the quality of China’s ODI data.
18 By and 
large, the empirical results illustrate the relevance of both standard ODI determinants and some 
China specific factors. 
The global economy is feeling the impact of China’s re-emergence. Besides its 
production and trade prowess, China is strengthening its outward investment activity. As a 
relatively new outward investor, China’s direct investment abroad is relatively small. According 
to the 2005 UNCTAD’s Outward FDI Performance Index, China ranked 71
st in the world.
19  
With its huge trade surplus and holding of international reserves, however, China has great 
potential to expand its outward investment activity.  
There are clues that China is actively promoting its investment activity abroad. In 
addition to the “going global” policy, China is posed to increase its portfolio investment capacity 
in overseas markets. For instance, the recently implemented qualified domestic institutional 
investors (QDII) program is a controlled measure that allows Chinese citizens to invest in 
overseas equity markets. Another sign of China’s intent to promote its outward investment is the 
establishment of the sovereign wealth fund – China Investment Corp. Very likely, China’s 
overseas portfolio investment will make its presence known in the global financial market in the 
near future. When more data on portfolio investment are available, it will be of interest to assess 
China’s overseas investment policy using data on both ODI and portfolio investment.  
                                                 
18   To be fair, there is a general concern about the quality of statistics on FDI from 
developing and transition countries (UNCTAD, 2006). 
19   The index compares an economy’s share of world outward FDI against its share of world 
GDP. The Inward FDI Performance Index is defined in a similar manner using inward FDI. In 
2005, China ranked 55 according to the Inward FDI Performance Index ((UNCTAD, 2006).   30
Appendix A: Additional Figures 
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Note: 1) unit on the y-axis: million USD, and 2) one dot represents one country   32
Figure A.3: The distribution of China's ODI stock among the top 38 developing countries 
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Note: 1) unit on the y-axis: million USD, and 2) one dot represents one country   33
Appendix B: Country Groupings 
 
Countries in the sample are listed according to various grouping criteria. 
 
B.1 Developing  Countries: 
 
Africa: Algeria, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zambia; 
East Asia: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Macau, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; 
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, 
Russia; 
Middle East: Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; 
Oceania: Papua New Guinea; 
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela; 
South Asia: India, Pakistan. 
 
B.2 Developed  Countries: 
 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, the United States 
 
B.3 Oil  Exporters: 
 
Algeria, Canada, Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, 
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen.   34
Appendix C: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
 
ODI  China's approved outward direct investment scaled by the host country’s 
population, in logs. [Source: Editorial Broad of the Almanac of China's 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1992-2006)] 
GDP  The ratio of host country's nominal GDP to China's nominal GDP in current 
US dollar. [Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators] 
RGDPpc  The ratio of host country's real per capita GDP to China's in constant 2000 
US dollar. [Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators]  
GDPG  Host country's real GDP growth rate. [Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators] 
Risk  The aggregated political risk index of each host country. The index 
comprises 12 components: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in 
politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability, bureaucracy quality. [Source: The International Country Risk 
Guide] 
Wage  The ratio of host country’s average annual wage of manufacturing industries 
(ISIC 3) to China’s. The wage data are converted into US dollar using 
average period exchange rate. [Source: The UN International labor 
Organization  LABORSTA, Geneva and International Financial Statistics] 
Fuelx  The share of fuels exports to total merchandise exports. [Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators] 
Orex  The share of ores and metals exports to total merchandise exports. [Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators] 
Raw  The share of raw material (including fuels, ores and metals) exports to total 
merchandise exports. [Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators] 
XShare  China’s exports to a country normalized by world’s total export to the 
country. [Source: IMF Directions of Trade] 
Aggl  The ratio of China’s ODI stock in a host country to total China’s ODI stock. 
[Source: Editorial Broad of the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (1992-2006)] 
Trend  Time trend. 
Reserve  China's total international reserves, including gold, scaled by China's 
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